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Abstract 
Achieving stable electricity power supply has been a problem in Nigeria since independence. The devastating 
consequences on social life and economic development encouraged the state to embrace privatization as a 
panacea, and coupled with testimonial of improved performance of power supply from both developed and 
developing countries experiences. However, since Nigeria’s decision to privatize resides with political leadership 
in the sector laden with interest, to what extent can one posit that political considerations does not interfere with 
pre-privatization selection process of private ownership and post-privatization management  respectively. The 
uncertainty around this informs this study. This research adopts survey research design using questionnaire to 
elicit data from residential and commercial customers of Ibadan and Ikeja distribution companies, with Policy 
Choice theory as its theoretical anchor. Descriptive and multiple regression statistics were employed for the data 
analysis. The findings show that political interests overshadowed national interest in the selection process of 
private distribution companies and their post-privatization operations having a negative effect on performance. 
Thus, we recommend citizens’ intensive demand for due process and transparency from policy makers and a 
more proactive oversight by the legislative arm of government.  
Keywords: Political Considerations, Performance, Distribution Companies, Power Sector, Reforms.      
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria Electricity Supply Industry (NESI), as observed by Sahara Reporter (2018), is strongly tied to the central 
government and public officials, and also used to canvass votes every four years. This results in politicization of 
the sector and zero-sum game by the political elites. Moreover, citizens’ demand for stable electricity supply 
seems heightened and its deleterious effects on the socio-economic condition appear worrisome. This, in part, 
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motivated the federal government’s decision under president Obasanjo in 1999 to Slate National Electricity 
Power Authority (NEPA), an inefficient public enterprise operating as monopoly in a non-competitive market for 
privatization (Adelaja, 2007). 
Furthermore, Power Sector Reform Bill (PSRB) was enacted in 2005, enabling the private sector participation in 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution. While Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was 
incorporated as NEPA’s successor, the PSRB also made PHCN to be unbundled into six generation companies 
(GENCOs), one transmission company (TCN) and eleven distribution companies with Nigeria Electricity 
Regulatory Commission as the sector regulatory agency (Onagoruwa, 2011). By this act, the sector was 
deregulated and private operators were engaged to manage both the GENCOs and DISCOs with government 
retaining 20 and 40 percent shares in both respectively and TCN was placed under management contract. 
However, it seems the populace expectations on uninterrupted electricity supply were not met as this still 
remains part of their daily experience under the private managers in a liberalized environment. As such, 
observers, across legislative arm of government, civil societies and individuals have raised doubts on technical, 
management and financial capabilities of new private investors, especially the DISCOs, which were used as 
criteria in the privatization selection process for the best bidders. This seems to corroborate Enebeli-Uzor’s 
(2013:54) averment that “…. beyond the economic efficiency thesis of the free market argument, there are 
ulterior reasons bordering on politics, ideology and regime survival that are usually behind the economic 
justifications for the adoption of privatization”.  
Arising from the above, the social concerns and economic progress often touted as rationale for privatization 
appears subservient to political interest furthering of the policy makers. Political considerations find expression in 
private ownership of DISCOs or GENCOs by political elites and their cronies. Hence, the interest of both political 
class and private investors are preserved under the market economy. In this sense, it is plausible to argue that 
political maneuvering underline the privatization process of DISCOs in Nigeria, and this circumscribes merit and 
efficiency. Thus, this work investigates the effect of politicization of the bidding process on the performance of 
Ibadan and Ikeja electricity distribution companies in the Nigeria under the power sector reform. 
1.1 Objective of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the influence of politics on the post-privatisation performance of 
Ibadan and Ikeja distribution companies (2005-2018). Additionally, this research seeks to 
Find out the extent of sincerity and transparency of policy makers in the selection of Ibadan and Ikeja’s DISCOs 
ownership. 
1.2 Research Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses are stated in null form to test political considerations on the post-privatisation performance of 
IBEDC and IKEDC. 
H0  Politics of interpersonal relationship does not influence selection of IBEDC and IKEDC  
Ho Policy maker are not sincere in the selection of IBEDC and IKEDC 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW: POLITICISATION AND PRIVATISATION PROCESS-THE 
NIGERIA EXPERIENCE 
Politicization of privatization process is mostly reiterated in the literature, but hardly been empirically studied. 
Though, studies on the post-privatisation performance of electricity sector across countries are well documented 
in literature, the political intricacies around the privatization process appears not comprehensively investigated.  
According Ferreria (2009), privatization in Nigeria is synonymous with sales of national economic assets at 
cheap prices to politicians’ cronies, public officers and supporters of the politicians or the politicians themselves. 
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This assertion highlights politician’s desire to convert public utilities to private advantage or personal socio-
economic benefits. In this line of thought, Omoleke and Adesopo (2005) blamed political interference in the 
privatization process generally on poor leadership the country is blessed with non-committed leadership.  
Furthermore, Kalejaiye, Adebayo and Olufemi, (2013) argue with respect to the power sector’s privatization that 
the masses are skeptical about government’s sincerity on not selling the utility to corrupt ex-public officials. In 
this sense, the sincerity of purpose expected from the policy makers is observed in breach and explains doubts 
expressed by the populace. Put differently, ensuring a level playing ground for potential and real investors which, 
according to Ochugudu and Onodugo (2013), ought to facilitate service delivery has taken flight. 
The above averment appears to be correct going by the current mMinister of Power, Works and Housing, 
Babatunde Fashola, submission that privatization is a right step but political interference, political dishonesty 
amongst other factors constrained power sector from yielding positive results (Vanguard, 2017). An 
acknowledgement of politicization of the sector reforms, in which privatization is central, suggest parochial 
interest by the politicians and devastating consequences on the sector’s performance capacity.              
2.1 Theoretical Framework: Public Choice Theory 
The adoption of public choice theory for this work is premised on its relevance or applicability to decision making. 
The theory was postulated by Duncan Black (1940) (Tullock in Rowley, 2004:3) with contributions from Kenneth 
Arrow, James Buchanran, Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, Willians Niskanen amongst others (Willians, 
2008:np). Moreover, public choice theory is described to posses varied analytical style, such, as rational choice, 
social choice or positive political economy (Muller cited in Wright, 1993). It implies that the features of rationality, 
socialism and political-economy are embedded in the theory and portrays the correlation between politics and 
economics alongside the political leaders making of economic decisions in a polity. 
The theory argues that an average human being is egoistic, rational, maximizes utility with these behaviour 
manifesting as political leaders and bureaucrats aspire to maximize their individual satisfaction (Wright, 1993). In 
other word, political leaders and bureaucrats, serving as public policy makers, largely considered their personal 
interest or benefit before arriving at decisions on what is popularly referred to as “Public Policy”. In this sense, it 
suggests that policies emanating from public circle can hardly be divorced from self-interest of the decision 
makers, and, where such seems to represent that of the populace, it is probably out of sheer coincidence. As 
such, public decisions are primarily targeted at satisfying decision makers’ interest, making secondary that of the 
citizens they hold the office in trust for. Hence, this indicates that general interest is almost subservient to 
individual interests in public management. 
From the thrust of the theory, one can infer that the government resolution to privatise Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs 
might be difficult to diffuse from the preservation of decision maker’s interest. While the choice of the private 
investors are rationalised on the merit of technical, management and financial capacity as articulated in the act 
stipulating due process, the infiltration of personal interest in the course of implementation, accommodating 
considerations for cronies or influential classes in the society, violate the spirit of the law that is hardly 
acknowledged by  policy makers. Therefore, can one, with safely, argue that Ibadan and Ikeja distribution 
companies owners are the best amongst others contenders or bidders for the public asset?  Or, has there not 
been undue interest of policy makers with the private investors prior to and after the privatization process?  An 
affirmative response to these questions would validate this theory and uphold its relevance to this study. 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Research Design: 
The study employs survey research design. It obtained primary data through 4-point Likert-type questionnaire 
administered on residential and commercial customers of IBEDC and IKEDC customers as respondents. 
3.2 Population of the Study: 
The population of the study comprises of residential and commercial customers Ibadan and Ikeja electricity 
distribution companies excluding industrial customers. The total number of both category of customer is 
1,595,000 (IBEDC prospectus, 2018), while that of Ikeja is 690,000 (IKEDC prospectus, 2018) amounting to 
2,285,00. 
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3.3 Sampling and Sampling Technique: 
Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) formula for known population was used to determine the sample for the study. 
Table 3.1shows 95% confidence level, a sample size of seven hundred and eighty one is derived at from the 
population of 2,285,000. However, the sample of Ibadan DISCOs was increased by 30% according to Israel 
(2013) giving a to total of 881. 
Also, multi-stage sampling technique, which involved stratified and simple random sampling techniques, was 
adopted. Stratified sampling was used to categories the population into distribution regions and offices while 
simple random sampling adopted to determine towns and cities selected for administration of questionnaire. This 
ensures representation of the population. 
Table 3.1 Determining Sample Size of  Known Population 
 
3.4 Method of Data Collection: 
Questionnaire designed for the study using Likert-scale was used to collect data for the study. The questionnaire 
was administered on both residential and commercial customers within the selected franchise areas of Ibadan 
and Ikeja DISCOs. However, 732 representing 83.1 percent questionnaire was retrieved out of 881 
administered.  
3.5 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument:  
Quantitative primary data for this study was tested by content validated by senior academic staff in the 
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Department of political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. Also, 
Cronbach Alpha test used to measure internal consistency gave 0.8 indicating it is reliable since it exceeds 0.7 
according to its rule. 
3.6 Method of Analysis 
Both descriptive and inferential statistical methods of analysis were adopted for this work. The data obtained 
through questionnaire was shown in tables for descriptive analysis and Product Moment regression analysis was 
used to test the two hypotheses posed for the study. Multiple regression analysis is credited with establishing an 
index of relationship between two variables. Special package for social science (SPSS) version 17 was used to 
run the analysis. 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Bio-Data Info Items 
IBEDC IKEDC Total Total 
% % Freq % 
Gender 
Male 
229 160 
389 53.1 
(55%) (50.6%) 
Female 
187 156 
343 46.9 
(45%) (49.4%) 
Total 416 316 732 100.00 
Age Grade 
18-30 
246 136 
382 52.2 
59.1 (43%) 
31-40 
86 86 
172 23.5 
(20.7%) (27.2%) 
41-50 
52 46 
98 13.4 
(12.5%) (14.6%) 
51-60 
31 32 
63 8.6% 
(7.5%) (10.1%) 
61 years and above 
1 16 
17 2.3% 
(0.2%) (5.1%) 
Total 416 316 732 100.00 
Marital Status 
Single 
228 142 
370 50.5 
(54.8%) (44.9%) 
Married 
182 164 
346 47.3 
(43.8%) (51.9%) 
Divorced 
3 4 
7 1.0 
(0.7%) (1.3%) 
Separated 
3 6 
9 1.2 
(0.7%) (1.9%) 
Total 416 316 732 100.00 
Customers’ 
Category 
Residential Customers  
319 238 
557 76.1 
(76.7%) (75.3%) 
Commercial Customers  
97 78 
175 23.9 
(23.7%) (24.7%) 
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Total 416 316 732 100.00 
Educational 
Qualification  
Primary Educ. 
7 22 
29 4.0 
(1.7%) (7.0%) 
Junior Educ. 
7 18 
25 3.4 
(1.7%) (5.7%) 
Senior Educ. 
75 88 
163 22.3 
(18%) (27.8%) 
Tertiary Educ. 
319 176 
495 67.6 
(76.7%) (55.7%) 
Others 
8 12 
20 2.7 
(1.9%) (3.8%) 
Total 416 316 732 100.00 
Source: Field Survey (2018) Computation from SPSS 1.7 Analysis 
Table 4.1 shows the gender, age, marital status, customer’s category and education level of respondents in the 
electricity distribution company franchise area used for this research at 53.1 percent and 46.9 were males and 
females respectively while the age grade between 18-30 constitute 52.2 percent, 31-40 account for 23.4 percent, 
41-50 represents 8.6 percent and 61 years and above at 2.3% percent. Marital status shows single having 50.5 
percent, married 47.3, divorced 1.0 and separated at 1.2 percent. The customers’ category indicates 76.1 and 
23.9 for residential and commercial customers respectively. Educational qualification shows that primary is 4.0, 
junior 3.4, Tertiary 67.6 and other 2.7. The analysis implies that the respondents are appropriate for the purpose 
of this research improving the quality of data 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Research Questions 
Table: 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Political Consideration for Post-Privatization Performance 
Political Consideration  for Post-Privatization Performance of the Power Sector 
Items  Regional Offices Likert Scale 
IBEDC IKEDC SA A D SD 
Mean SD Mean SD 4 3 2 1 
Interpersonal Influence 
1 The owners of the distribution companies have good 
relationship with the government 
2.745 .911 2.715 .869 148 312 200 72 
2 The owners of the distribution companies are known 
people to the government 
2.966 .882 3.012 .800 204 368 106 54 
3 The owners of the distribution companies are powerful 
people with wealth and political power. 
3.266 .852 3.145 .830 323 276 100 33 
Apparent Sincerity 
1 I feel the selection of the distribution company is 
transparent 
1.971 .829 2.028 .877 33 164 302 233 
2 I am satisfied with the service of distribution company in 
my communities 
1.802 .875 1.819 .866 36 113 259 324 
3 The distribution company by the services provided has 
shown that they are good in the business of electricity 
supply. 
1.923 .909 2.019 .808 36 155 288 253 
Source: Field survey (2018)          
Source: Computation from SPSS 1.7 Analysis  
Table 4.2 identifies the degree of importance respondents place on interpersonal influence and apparent 
sincerity variable for measuring political considerations in the performance of Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs. The 
responses show that the most agreeable statement is the statement that “The owners of the distribution 
companies are powerful people with wealth and political power” with 81.8%, M=3.21 and S.D=0.84. 
Likewise, 80.5% (M=1.98, SD=0.46) expressed the highest disagreement with the statement “I feel the selection 
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of the distribution company is transparent” Respondents across both DISCOs have disposition towards the role 
of political considerations in the process that led to the emergence of the distribution companies. 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 
Table 4.3.1: Correlation Matrix between Post-Privatization and Performance Outcomes 
Correlations 
 Interpersonal 
Influence 
Apparent 
Sincerity 
Performance 
Outcome 
Interpersonal Influence 
Pearson Correlation 1 .010 .376
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .788 .000 
Apparent Sincerity 
Pearson Correlation .010 1 -.093
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .788  .012 
Performance Outcome 
Pearson Correlation .376
**
 -.093
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .012  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Field Survey (2018) Computation from SPSS 1.7 Analysis 
4.3.1 Test of Relationship between Interpersonal Influence and performance of Ibadan and Ikeja 
DISCOs 
Decision Rule: Using the guide that Evans (1996) suggests for the absolute value of r:co-19 “very weak” 20-39 
“Weak”, 40-59 “moderate” 60-29 “strong 80-1.0- “very strong” 
The research hypothesis one: Politics of interpersonal relationship does not influence selection of IBEDC and 
IKEDC, is investigated using pearson’s Product Moment Correlation co-efficient. The result showed there was a 
moderate, positive correlation between the two variables (interpersonal influence and performance of DICOs). 
The result implies that interpersonal relationship influences the choice of Ibadan and Ikeja electricity distribution 
companies in the selection process or procedure. Going by the rule, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
4.3.2 Test of Relationship between Apparent Sincerity and Emergence of Ibadan and Ikeja 
DISCOs. 
Decision Rule: 
The second research hypothesis: Policy maker are not sincere in the selection of IBEDC and IKEDC is 
investigated using pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient analysis. The result showed weak 
negative relationship between the two variables (apparent sincerity and performance of DISCOs). This result 
implies that policy makers were not sincere in handling the process that led to the emergence of Ibadan and 
Ikeja electricity distribution companies in the selection process or procedure.Going by the rule, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 4.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .388
a
 .151 .148 .403910 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Apparent_Sincerity, Interpersonal_Influence 
b. dependent variable: Performance Outcome  
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The results from the model summary table 4.3.2 revealed the extent to which the variance in the dependent 
variable (Performance Outcome) is explained by the independent variable (political consideration). The R-
squared is .151, which expressed as a percentage equals 15.1%. This means that 15.1% of the variance in 
performance outcome can be predicted by variables such as apparent sincerity and interpersonal influence. The 
adjusted R-squared is .148 (that is 14.8%) variability of the independent variable (political consideration: 
apparent sincerity and interpersonal influence). The standard error of the estimate indicates .403910 which 
signifies error term. The Durbin Watson result at 1.885 is within recommended range (1.5-2.5). 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this study, nexus between political considerations and performance of Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs was 
investigated. The findings shows, first, that prior interpersonal relationship influence the selection process and 
emergence of the DISCOs. This is instructive with implications that political leaders and bureaucrats’ cronies’ or 
allies are given preferential considerations in the process of selecting the most qualified bidders for the 
privatized DISCOs. DISCOs, in this sense, are not the most qualified bidders among contenders. In effect, did 
not possess the requisite technical, managerial and financial capacity for performance. This aligns with the claim 
of Fasola (2017) political interference and dishonesty, Eneli-Uzor (2013) ulterior motives of political leaders and 
Kalejaiye (2013) sales of public utility to ex-public officials  
The study also discovered that the policy makers were not sincere and transparent in handling the process that 
made Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs to emerge as the best amongst the bidders. This agrees with the interpersonal 
influence finding. Also, this finding reiterates adherence to laid down process and rules but not immune from 
managers’ surreptitious manipulations in other to align the outcomes with their prior expectations. Moreover, 
because the first finding revealed the preponderance of self interest promotion, corresponding with the tenets of 
public choice theory, it is difficult for the process to be absolutely transparent, such that is capable of revealing 
political leadership and bureaucrats’ covert interest. Therefore, the study conclude that political considerations 
affects significantly the post-privatisation performance of Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs and thus policy makers 
personal interest overshadowed common or national interest. 
5.2 Recommendations 
From the findings of the study, the study offers the following recommendations. 
(1) Nigerians must jointly demand for both due process and transparency while interest groups should champion 
both in the implementation of power sector reforms programme. This will vitiate the thriving of policy makers’ 
covert personal interest promotion under the disguise of adherence to the laid down process. 
(2) Citizens need to intensify demand for public accountability and legislative arm of government must live up to 
its billings of being proactive and productive in her oversight function.  
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